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Abstract 
Wage and employment differences between male and female agricultural labourers in the under 
developed countries including India is not new. With the help of a simple theoretical model it is 
here proved that public policy like implementation of National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Scheme (NREGS) in the rural areas can reduce wage discrimination but fails to reduce 
employment discrimination in the agricultural labour market. It is also proved that 
implementation of NREGS not only reduces profitability of the farm household but also 
decreases employment generation in the agricultural labour market. The paper suggests higher 
amount of monetary punishment charged by the Conciliation Committee at local panchayet 
formed by State Government for resolving dispute related with social protection of the 
agricultural labourer as suggested by National Commission for Enterprises in Unorganized 
Sector (NCEUS) in 2007 for depriving female agricultural labourers both in terms of wage and 
employment can be an effective public policy which can reduce wage as well as employment 
discrimination in the agricultural labour market. It is also proved that the loss of profit of the 
landlord due to charging higher amount of monetary punishment is less than implementation of 
NREGS in that region. The possible formation of the proposed Conciliation Committee is also 
suggested here. 
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Effective Public Policy which can Reduce Gender Discrimination in 
the Agricultural Labour Market: A Theoretical Investigation 
Introduction: 
Discrimination is a situation where workers of the same productivity receive different pay or 
workers of dissimilar productivity are paid equally. According to Gary Becker (1971) the size of 
wage differential between the majority and minority workers depend on two factors: (a) size of 
the minority group and (b) the extent of belief among the employers. In the agricultural labour 
market of India, a female agricultural labourer may be treated in the minority group of workers. 
A strong effort by civil rights activists of USA has been waged to amend the „Equal Pay Act‟ to 
incorporate a concept known as „Comparable worth‟. According to these activities firms practice 
two types of wage discrimination against women. First one is; women are paid less than men 
even doing exactly the same job. A second type of wage discrimination occurs when the job 
structure with in a firm substantially segregated by sex and women are paid less than men; even 
though both are performing work that although not the same, is of „comparable worth‟ value to 
the employer. The Equal Pay act declares the first type of wage discrimination illegal but 
discrimination of the second type is not a violation of the act since the two groups of workers are 
employed in different jobs. To remedy this situation, the advocates of „comparable worth‟ 
propose changing the wording of the act from „equal pay for equal work‟ to „equal pay for jobs 
of equal value‟. Under this version of the law, employer would be required to pay similar wages 
to men and women not only for the same job but for all jobs that are of same value to the firm, 
regardless of the actual title or function. The concept of „comparable worth‟ can also be applied 
in the agricultural labour market of India in order to combat gender discrimination. According to 
the 61
st
 round NSSO report, 94% of the female labour force of India is employed in the 
unorganized sector and merely 6% are employed in the organized sector. Again out of the 94% 
of the female labourers found in the unorganized sector almost 72% is working in the 
agricultural sector. The size of female agricultural workers are not small in rural India, rather the 
size is rising over time. According to the Indian Census data, 2001 over the period 1961-2001 the 
percentage of rural women workers classified as agricultural labourer have increased from 25.6% 
to 43.4% compared to the increase from 16.2% to 27.4% for men.  In their study Ramachandran 
and others (2001) had shown that feminization of agricultural workers is rising and that is 
observed through the rising proportion of female agricultural workers in female work force and a 
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rise in the ratio of female to male agricultural labourers. Actually after the decline in labour force 
participation rate during 1993-94 to 1999-2000, the indicator recovered during the period 1999-
2000 to 2004-05 making the resurgence of employment growth. This is true in case of both 
males and females. According to the 61
st
 round of NSSO survey, the labour force participation 
rate among the male agricultural labourer has increased from 533 per thousand to 546 per 
thousand while for female it increased from 235 per thousand to 249 per thousand. But they are 
not given equal wages as compared to the men. It is often argued that since women do less 
laborious work than men, they receive lower wages than men. But wage discrimination of 
women exists even for similar types of work performed by men as well as female labourers like 
threshing harvesting etc.  Agricultural operations are substitutable among men and women, but 
different stages of production process are often divided into male specific and female specific 
jobs and different wage rates are fixed for these two types of jobs invariably paying higher wages 
for male specific jobs due to the assumption that male specific jobs are more stalled than the 
female specific. Foster and Resenzweigh(1996) using data from Philippines had shown that men 
were more likely to undertake agricultural task that requires greater upper body strength such as 
plowing were as women are more likely to be engaged in activities such as weeding, harvesting. 
So according to their findings the division of labour by gender thus depends on comparative 
advantage of the sex in various tasks. But in India it is observed that even if the same operations 
are undertaken both by male and female agricultural laborers, higher wages are paid to the male 
laborers on the basis of the belief that the productive capacity of male laborers is more than that 
of the females because of their superior physical strength though duration of work of both types 
of workers in the field are same. Actually most of the activities in agricultural production except 
ploughing, women are actively involved and are employed in different parts of cultivation like 
transplantation, harvesting, weeding, sowing etc. Still mainly due to lack of sufficient bargaining 
power during the time of wage determination and the wrong belief of the employer, a female 
agricultural labourer face discrimination both in terms of wage and employment than their male 
counterpart. Gender discrimination in wages is defined as gap in earnings between male and 
female workers. Discrimination against women in the payment of wages is very common in 
India. In the national level a female agricultural labourer is paid 27% less on an average than her 
male counterpart. Table-1 shows gender differentiation in the agricultural labour market of India. 
The Table shows that between 1999 and 2008 the wage rates in different phases of agricultural 
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production have improved in monetary terms but that fails to reduce gender discrimination. The 
table shows in India on an average the wage rate of a male agricultural labourer in a particular 
man day is more than that of a female agricultural labourer.   
A state wise analysis of male-female daily earnings ratio based on Rural Labour Enquiry (of the 
NSSO) had shown increasing male-female wage differentials in the late 1990s in a large number 
of states. In Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh and Maharastra the male-female earnings gap 
not only continued to increase but the ratio was more than 1.5. Kundu (2006) during his village 
level survey had observed that in different districts of West Bengal, a female agricultural 
labourer receive less than man even for similar type of work. They are also recruited less number 
of man-days in compare to their male counterpart. If we divide an agricultural production 
process in different phases then as far as ploughing is concerned, higher wage for a male 
agricultural labourer than his female counterpart is justified though in very few situations a 
female is engaged in ploughing. But in other phases of agricultural activity most of the situations 
female agricultural labourer is paid less than male even though both male and female agricultural 
labourers work more or less for same length of time and same kind of work in the field. In spite 
of that, in terms of employment, male agricultural labourers are recruited proportionately more 
than female agricultural labourers both in number and in terms of number of man-days.  
Two important Public Policies consider by the Indian Government which may reduce 
Gender Discrimination in Agricultural Labour Market: 
The Second National Commission of Labour (SNCL, 2002) was asked to examine the issue a 
comprehensive legislation for unorganized sector workers. The Commission made significant 
recommendations on reform of labour law in the country. The proposed legislation includes 
implementation of minimum wage, equal remuneration act and normal eight working hours for 
each worker etc. The SNCL proposed a Central Board at the centre and State Boards at the state 
levels for administration of the bill. It also recommended a district level board at the district level 
and Welfare Facilitation Centers (WFC) at lower level for same purposes. The WFC should bear 
the responsibility to resolve any dispute arising out of employment relating to wage and working 
conditions. It may also take the help of Lok Adalats or Labour Courts. As a follow up to the 
SNCL recommendation, the Ministry of Labour of India has proposed a Comprehensive 
legislation for regulation of employment and conditions of service of the unorganized workers to 
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provide safety, social security, health and welfare. So National Commission for Enterprises in 
the Unorganized Sector (NCEUS) was formed to recommend the social security required for 
these huge unorganized labour forces of India. This commission has proposed two draft bills 
regarding the conditions of work and livelihood promotion in 2007. The first bill is applicable to 
the agricultural workers and the other for the non-agricultural workers. Two separate bills have 
been provided to take care of specific issues being faced by the two different sets of wage 
workers. Here the agricultural workers are casual in nature which means a worker is casually 
engaged in agriculture in consideration of wages. Some important recommendations of NCEUS 
for the agricultural workers are mentioned below. 
1. Normal working hour of each labourer shall be limited to eight hours a day, beyond 
which a worker will be paid overtime at one and a half of the normal rate of wage per 
hour. 
2. Each worker should be paid according to the State declared minimum wage which should 
be no less than Central Government recommended National Minimum Wage. During the 
time of fixation of a National Minimum Wage, the Central Government will appoint a 
committee consisting of employer representative, wage worker representative and experts 
in that field. The wage will be fixed after considering the minimum basic needs of the 
wage workers and the family. Minimum wage law sets a legal minimum on the wages 
that the employer has to pay to his employees. For the unskilled and informal workers, 
the minimum wage helps them to get wage above the equilibrium wage in a labour 
abundant economy.  
3. No employer can discriminate any agricultural worker in terms on wage and employment 
on the basis of sex. 
To enforce those recommendations, The State Government by rules will constitute Dispute 
Resolution Council (DRC) at district level and Conciliation Committee (CC) at block or 
panchayat level for resolving disputes related with social protection of the agricultural workers. 
The composition of the CC is tripartite and consists of an officer designated by the state 
government, one representative from the employer and one from the workers. The state 
government may appoint two persons for advice the Conciliation Committee. If the committee 
detects any dispute or violation of any recommended social security norms on the workers, it can 
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punish the employer. Here the punishment is either imprisonment up to one year or with fine 
which may extend up to five thousand rupees.   
    We know that law enforcement is an important component of any government regulation. The 
most important measure for improving the livelihood of an agricultural labourer is proper 
implementation of the minimum wage act. As the agricultural labourers most of the times have 
no effective bargaining power, the minimum wage rate is fixed by the Central and State 
government under the provision of Minimum Wage Act. 1948. It was told that enforcement of 
minimum wage in agriculture is a real problem because inspectors are generally reluctant to visit 
farmer‟s field and employers are also reluctant to co-operate with them whenever such visits are 
undertaken. So when minimum wage law cannot be properly enforced. 
World development report (2012) has given much focus on gender equality particularly in the 
poorer regions. National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) was initiated in India 
in 2006. Two main interesting features of this programme are (i) the wage rate per day provided 
in this programme will be uniform across gender and (ii) it will give priority to female 
employment and targets that 33 percent of the beneficiaries should be women. We therefore can 
hypothesize that introduction of this programme should lead to greater labour force participation 
of women and which can be effective to reduce gender discrimination in the labour market 
mainly in agriculture both in terms of wage and employment.   
Actually wage discrimination on the basis of gender in Indian agriculture is a common issue for 
discussion. Enhancement of the bargaining power of the women through any public policy or 
specific law of the State as well as the Central Government can be effective to reduce the wage 
as well as employment discrimination in the labour market. An investigation is required to 
establish which public policy is effective to minimize the problem.  
In this paper we assume that a male agricultural labourer is getting wage more than subsistence 
wage in that area and there exists downward wage rigidity of that due to their higher bargaining 
power but a female labourer is deprived from getting that wage and their wage is totally 
controlled by the employer. The government‟s basic objective is to reduce wage discrimination 
in the labour market. But in this paper we should not be confined ourselves only to wage 
discrimination but also on employment discrimination because we know that a female 
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agricultural labourer is not inefficient during the time of production process. We know that three 
different theories of labour market discrimination are based on (i) prejudice, (ii) market power 
and (iii) imperfect information. Out of those three, we here consider the first two in our model. 
Prejudice of the employer cum big farmer indicates the situation when the employer as well as 
the farmer has a belief that a male agricultural labourer is comparatively more productive than a 
female agricultural labourer. Now the question is whether higher amount of penalty in monetary 
terms can play any significant role to reduce gender discrimination both in terms of wage and 
employment in the agricultural labour market. Besides that we shall also investigate whether 
gender discrimination in the agricultural labour market can be reduced after implementation of 
NREGS in that area Now in the presence of two above mentioned factors we shall here try to 
find out an appropriate policy which can combat gender discrimination in the agricultural labour 
market both in terms of wages and employment where the belief of comparable worth is also 
given equal importance. 
The Theoretical Model: 
Consider a village economy where there is only one farmer who cultivates certain plot of his own 
land fully with the help of hired local agricultural labourers which comprise of both male 
labourers and female labourers. Here for simplicity of our model assume labour is the only factor 
of production and the production function is neo-classical type and follows diminishing marginal 
productivity for both types of labourers. The landlord cum employer enjoys monopsony power in 
the agricultural labour market. There exists gender discrimination in the agricultural labour 
market both in terms of wage and employment. Here Lm and Lf indicate total number of male 
and female agricultural labourers employed by the landlord respectively in the entire production 
process. We assume the presence of NREGS in that village economy where the wage rate offered 
for one man-day of work is W0. The male agricultural labourers are much more unionized and 
their bargaining power is much higher compare to their female agricultural labourers. So they 
agree to work under the landlord if each of them offered WM which is higher than W0. But due to 
lack of proper bargaining power, the female agricultural labourers is getting less than WM.  The 
female labourer supply function of the gender discriminating monopsonist landlord is expressed 
as . W0 is the 
non-farm wage rate in that region. So if the landlord wants to employ a female agricultural 
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labourer in his production process, then he has to offer her at least W0 for her availability in the 
production process. It is also already assumed that WM > Wf. Under social security law for the 
unorganized agricultural workers, underpayment to each female labourer is illegal. Penalty in 
monetary terms will be charged by the government recommended body if violation of social 
security norm is detected from the side of the employer. Let „p‟ be the probability of being 
caught for depriving a female agricultural labourer to offer her wage less than the minimum 
wage and the size of penalty for depriving one female agricultural labourer for giving one unit 
less than the minimum wage is denoted as „k‟ where  and it is exogenously determined. 
So the expected cost (the amount of penalty or fine ) the landlord has to bear due to offering less 
than minimum wage to Lf  number of female agricultural labourer will be .   
The Neo-classical type production function of the landlord is here expressed as follows where we 
observe diminishing marginal productivity condition for both Lm and Lf.  
  
If the farmer is selling his product at unit price, then the profit function of the partial complying 
farmer cum employer can be expressed as  
Π(Lm, Lf) =  
Where the inequality constraint is  <  
We can solve the above optimization problem with strict inequality constraint with the help of 
Kuhn-Tucker conditions and we have;  
 
                    = }  ..(5)     
We also have  
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   = < 0 ,  = b(b-1)  and 
 =  0……………………………………………….(6) 
So following Hessian Determinant we can say  
as  
…and (a+b) < 1………………………..(7)  
Solving the equations (4) and (5) we have  (the two interior solutions), the optimum 
employment generation of male and female agricultural labourers by the gender discriminating 
monopsonist landlord at the profit maximizing level
2
. It is also true that  and 
 as WM is assumed as unchanged wage rate of a male agricultural labourer.   
Proposition-1: The landlord at profit maximizing level will employ more male agricultural 
labourer than the female agricultural labourer provided  
Proof:  Dividing equation (4) by equation (5) we have  
 
As the production function is neo classical type, following the property of diminishing marginal 
productivity of the factor,   if and only if  or aLf < bLm. On the basis of this 
condition we also have   which is not impossible
3
. We know that „a‟ and „b‟ are 
elasticity of output with respect to „Lm‟ and „Lf‟ respectively where it is already assumed that 
. According to the perception of the landlord cum employer‟ a > b. Now larger the gap 
                                                          
2
 Hence we rule out the possibility of corner solution where the landlord will employ only male 
agricultural labourer or only female agricultural labourer at his profit maximizing level.  
3
 In the agricultural labour market the wage gap between a male and a female agricultural 
labourer is not so wide (Kundu 2006). The female agricultural labourers  are generally employed 
during the time of sowing, threshing and harvesting. Suppose per day WM = Rs.100 and Wf = Rs. 
80 and α = 1.1. Then automatically (α+1)Wf > WM  
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between „a‟ and „b‟ higher will be the difference between 4 more employment 
discrimination will be observed between the male agricultural labourer and female agricultural 
labourer. The employment discrimination can be totally removed or the landlord will be 
indifferent between employing male and female agricultural labourer provided aLf = bLm 
Now the question is how we can combat this gender discrimination in the agricultural labour 
market both in terms of wage and employment?  
The indirect profit function of the landlord can now expressed as  
 
………….(9) 
Gender discrimination in the labour market can be changed through using W0, „k‟ individually as 
both the instrument are beyond the control of the employer as well as the landlord.  
Implementation of NREGS and its impact on Wage, Employment and Profitability of the 
Producer: 
Proposition-2: Implementation of NREGS will reduce employment generation among both types 
of workers in the agricultural sector.  
Implementation of NREGS in that area will help the existing labourers both male and female to 
have alternative employment opportunity where the government decided wage is much higher 
than W0. So we can say that, implementation of that programme in that area can enhance W0. As 
we have already assumed that WM is rigid in the downward direction, and it is far above than W0, 
we can say that no impact will be observed on the wage rate of the male agricultural labourers. 
But following the labour supply function, wage as well as employment will be directly affected 
of the female agricultural labourers due to enhancement of W0.  Few indirect effects will also be 
observed on Lm.  
From equation (4) and (5) we have 
                        and 
                                                          
4
 Suppose a=0.4 and b=0.3 and  As aLf < bLm Lf will be at most 7. Similarly if a=0.45  
b=0.25 and  
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Now solving the above equations (9) and (10) with the help of Cramer‟s rule we have  
 
 
So we can conclude that implementation of NREGS will reduce employment generation of both 
the female as well as male labourers in the agricultural sector.    
Proposition-3: Given WM, the male-female wage discrimination in the agricultural labour market 
can be reduced if and only if  
Proof.  We have       ……………………………………………(13) 
Now at given WM, the gender discrimination in terms of wage in the agricultural labour market 
can be reduced if and only if    
Considering the negative relationship between Lf
*
 and W0, from relation (13)  we have  
 
Now   > 0  provided  
 
The above relation establishes the fact that in spite of the fall of Lf due to implementation of 
NREGS, the wage rate of the female agricultural labourer will increase provided the elasticity of 
employment generation with respect to W0 will be inelastic in nature.   
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Proposition-4: Enhancement of W0 fails to reduce employment discrimination in agricultural 
labour market. 
Employment discrimination among gender in the agricultural labour market can be reduced if 
and only if   
Before implementation of NREGS, we have already proved that  . It has been also 
proved from (11) and (12) that rise of W0 after implementation of NREGS wage reduces 
employment generation on both types of labourers. Now gender discrimination in the labour 
market in terms of employment can be minimized provided   i.e. proportionate fall 
of employment of male agricultural labourers should be more than their female counterparts and 
that will happen if and only if    which is not possible
5
. So after hike of W0
, 
 the 
gap between Lm  and Lf will be wider. 
Actually due to enhancement of W0
 
 after implementation of NREGS, the landlord has to reduce 
the employment generation of both types of labourers. But as employer believes the productive 
capacity of the male agricultural labourer is more than female agricultural labourer, the drop of 
employment generation among the male agricultural labourers is less than the female agricultural 
labourers which ultimately fails to reduce employment discrimination in the agricultural labour 
market after implementation of NREGS in that region.  
Proposition-5: There should be an upper limit of the enhancement of NREGS wage say  
beyond which the employer-cum landlord will stop his agricultural production. 
One of the prime objectives of NREGS is to reduce gender discrimination in the agricultural 
labour market mainly in terms of wage. Then following Proposition-3, NREGS is an effective 
public policy. But the question is how far government will hike the NREGS wage. Initially we 
assume that the opportunity cost of profit or the earning of the landlord from the alternative 
source of income is   . Now we apply Envelope theorem in Eq.(9), where we assume that WM 
and „k‟ both are kept unchanged. Application of the theorem gives the following result: 
                                                          
5
 Suppose, Lm = 10,  Lf =7, a = 0.4 and b = 0.3  then (1-a)Lf* = 4.2 and bLm* = 3. Similarly if 
a=0.45, b = .25, Lm = 10 and Lf = 7 then also (1-a)Lf* = 3.85 and bLm* = 2.5  
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So optimum profit curve of the monopsonist landlord is negatively sloped and convex in nature.  
  We have already assumed that W0 < WM as Wf < WM. Now from Figure-1, it is clear that the 
landlord will continue his agricultural production process and employ female as well as male 
agricultural labourers until NREGS wage hikes up to  . Beyond which no employment will be 
generated in the agricultural labour market.  
Impact on Wage, Employment and Profitability if fine in Monetary terms is charged on 
Employer due to discriminating Female Agricultural labourer from Male counterparts in 
terms of Wage and Employment;.  
Proposition-6: Higher ‘k’ keeping W0 undisturbed will increase both ‘  and  and can reduce 
wage gap between male and female agricultural labourers provided   < 0 
Proof: Using equations (4) and (5) and with the help of Cramer‟s rule we have  
 
 
Hence, the gender discrimination in the agricultural labour market in terms of wage can be 
minimized though charging high „k‟. Given WM , higher „k‟ will increase WF through increasing 
Lf which minimizes the gap between WM and Wf. Another positive aspect of this public policy is 
this policy will not reduce employment generation in the agricultural labour market just like 
implementation of NREGS in that area; rather it improves both male as well as female 
employment generation in the labour market.   
Proposition-7: Higher ‘k’ will also reduce employment discrimination in the agricultural labour 
market.  
Proof: Employment discrimination in the agricultural labour market can be minimized provided  
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 Now according to the constitutional law, the farmer as well as the employer is a member of the 
Conciliation Committee. The 59
th
 round of NSSO revealed that one third of the Indian farmers 
had claimed that farming is not so much profitable now a day. In this situation we have to 
identify the condition at which the discriminating monopsonist farmer will allow the Conciliation 
committee to charge high „k‟ in order to combat gender discrimination in the labour market both 
in terms of wage and employment. There should be an upper limit of „k‟. Higher „k‟ will 
discourage the farmer to continue his agricultural production activity.  
Proposition 8: „k’ should not be more than , i.e.   is subsistence level of ‘k’ 
Proof:  
 
 
So profit curve of the employer is negatively sloped and convex in nature.  
At , we consider that      So we have Fig-2, on the basis of which we can determine 
 .  
Comparative Impact Evaluation of Two Different Public Policies on Reduction of Gender 
Discrimination in Agricultural Labour Market: 
Hence it is proved that both the public policies will reduce the profitability of the farm 
household. But implementation of NREGS reduces the employment generation in the 
agricultural field where as higher amount of punishment does not do that. Actually higher „k‟ can 
reduce both wage and employment discrimination in the agricultural labour market 
Proposition-9: The farmer will prefer higher amount of ‘k’ to implementation of NREGS in that 
area provided (1-pk)  when  
Proof:  From Equation (15) and (19) we have the following results: 
 
Now, the rational farm household will always prefer the policy which can minimize their loss. 
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Now (1-pk) which indicates the amount of loss 
faced by the farmer cum employer after implementation of social security norm is comparatively 
less if „k‟ is hiked instead of W0.  
Conclusions: 
Following the recommendation of NCEUS government should take proper initiative to reduce 
gender discrimination in the agricultural labour market of India both in terms of wage and 
employment. The following steps can be taken by the government to combat that labour market 
discriminating problem. 
(1) Representation of female agricultural labourer should be included in the Committee of 
Dispute Resolution Council at district level and Conciliation committee at block or 
panchayat level. This can improve the probability that the employer is apprehended and 
punished for violating the social security norm.  
(2) The size of penalty should be high. As the size is decided in the meeting of the 
Conciliation Committee, the employer will be fully aware of that and there is no question 
of informational gap. So the non-complying farmer cum employer even if enjoying 
monopsony power in the labour market wants to minimize the gap between WM and Wf* 
in order to avoid the expected cost on penalty.  
(3) Actually it is difficult to reduce employment discrimination between the male and female 
agricultural labourers because the employer cum farmer has a belief that a male 
agricultural labourer is comparatively more productive than a female agricultural 
labourer. Still it is here proved that under certain conditions high „k‟ is comparatively 
more effective to reduce not only wage discrimination but alos employment 
discrimination marginally.  
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Table-1 
Gender Discrimination among the Agricultural Labourers of India in Terms of Average Daily 
Wage Rates (Rs.): 
Different Parts of 
Agricultural 
Production Process 
Male Agricultural Labourers Female Agricultural Labourers 
1999-00 September 2008 1999-00 September 2008 
Ploughing 36.64 99.35 33.21 50.71 
Sowing 38.75 86.32 28.30 61.99 
Transplanting 39.53 78.54 28.95 66.54 
Weeding 34.99 76.66 25.41 64.67 
Harvesting 38.44 85.26 29.30 48.34 
Threshing 39.31 84.26 27.72 65.20 
Source: Indian Labour Journal Dec. 2008 
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                                                         Fig - 1 
Maximum possible value of W0 i.e.  beyond which the landlord will stop his 
production as well as employment generation. 
 
 
          
 
          
 
 
 
 
         
                                                                                  
 
           O                                                                                               k  
                                                        Fig-2  
Maximum possible value of „k‟  i.e.  beyond which the landlord will stop his production 
as well as employment generation 
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